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Abstract
This paper analyzes optimal monetary policy under zero lower bound in the
presence of cost channel. Cost channel introduces trade-o¤ between output and
ination when economy is out of ZLB. As a result, exit time both under discretion
and commitment is endogenous in the presence of cost channel. We also nd that
commitment outperforms discretion by promising future boom and ination and a
T-only policy closely replicates commitment both under presence and absence of
cost channel. Moreover, the exit date (from ZLB) under discretion, commitment
and T-only policy rises with the magnitude of demand shock given the degree of
interest rate pass-through irrespective if the cost channel is present. We also show
that, while exit date both under discretion and T-only policy rises with the degree
of interest rate pass-through/credit market imperfection, it falls under commitment
given demand shock.
JEL Classication: E63, E52, E58
Keywords: New-Keynesian Model, Cost Channel, Liquidity Trap
1 Introduction
The recent nancial crisis has witnessed negative natural rate of interest due to large
adverse demand shock for a number of developed countries. This forces some of the major
central banks, e.g. Federal Reserve Bank, Bank of England, Bank of Japan and the Eu-
ropean Central Bank to reduce their target interest rates to (near) zero. In this situation,
monetary authority loses its ability to lower the nominal interest rate further to stimulate
economy. This paper analyzes the optimal policy under ZLB without uncertainty using a
New Keynesian DSGE model with cost channel.
The canonical New Keynesian DSGE model is the workhorse of modern monetary
policy analysis. Optimal policy of the canonical model under ZLB has already been
studied in detail by a series of paper such as, Jung, et. al. (2005), Eggertson and
Woodford (2003), Adam and Billi (2006, 2007) and Nakov (2008). This paper shows
that commitment outperforms discretion by promising future boom and ination and
also by postponing exit date. Chattopadhyay and Daniel (2016) show how an optimal
policy can be communicated through Taylor rule. They show that a Taylor rule with
properly chosen ination target can replicate commitment. The paper also proposes a
new T-only policy where exit date from ZLB is optimally chosen but monetary authority
follows discretion post-exit. Chattopadhyay and Daniel (2016) shows that a T-only policy
is easier to communicate and closely replicates outcome under commitment.
Even if the canonical New Keynesian model is highly popular and frequently used
in policy prescription, it has certain drawbacks. One of the drawbacks of the canonical
model is that, the model does not introduce any trade-o¤ between output and ination.
As a result uctuations of both output and ination can be simultaneously minimized,
known as "divine coincidence" in the literature. Ravenna and Walsh (2006) tackles the
problem of "divine coincidence" by introducing a cost channel into the canonical New
Keynesian DSGE model. They assume that rms borrow from nancial intermediaries
to pay for their wage bill and repays it with interest. As a result, beside output gap,
interest rate also a¤ects the marginal cost of the rm. A change in marginal cost due to
interest rate a¤ects over all ination through Phillips curve. This is known as interest
rate pass-through in the literature.
A few number of empirical studies have already been undertaken to check the im-
portance of cost channel. However, no conclusive evidence have been found. Barth and
Ramey (2001) has given evidence about the presence cost channel by estimating a VAR
model using aggregate and industry level data for the period 1959-2000 for US. The paper
argues that monetary policy shock should be treated as a supply side shock as the charac-
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teristics of impulse responses due to a monetary policy shock is similar to a productivity
or supply shock, which is very di¤erent from the characteristics of impulse responses ob-
tained from various other demand shocks. Christiano et. al. (2005) also gives evidence in
favor of cost channel for US. Chowdhury et. al. (2006) have estimated a hybrid version
of New Keynesian Phillips curve with cost channel through GMM and shows a signicant
presence of cost channel in majority of G-7 countries like Canada, France, Italy, UK and
US. Ravenna andWalsh (2005) has also got evidence in favor of cost channel by estimating
forward looking Phillips curve with cost channel using quarterly US data for the period
1960-2001. Tillman (2008) shows evidence of cost channel for US, UK and Euro area by
estimating a forward looking hybrid Phillips Curve for each country using quarterly data
for the time period 1960-2004. A year later, Tillman (2009) uses a rolling window GMM
estimate to assess time varying nature of cost channel for US. The paper nds signicant
presence of cost channel in pre-Volker era and post Volker-Greenspan era.
Rabanal (2007) has on the other hand has estimated a DSGE model for US using
quarterly data from 1950 to 2004 through Bayesian approach. The paper shows that
transmission mechanism of monetary policy through demand side dominates the supply
side e¤ect. Later, a related study by Henzel et al. (2009) shows that though the cost
channel fails to generate a price puzzle for the Euro area, its presence however, explain
the initial hump in prices due to a monetary policy tightening.
Although a good number of empirical studies have been undertaken to asses the impor-
tance of cost channel, theoretical works related to the optimal policy under cost channel
are very limited in number. Ravenna and Walsh (2006) and Araujo (2009) have analyzed
the optimal policy both under discretion and commitment. However, these papers have
not undertaken the ZLB constraint of nominal interest rate explicitly in their analysis.
The model of Ravenna and Walsh (2006) is modied later by Chowdhury, et. al. (2006)
by introducing nancial market imperfection which a¤ects the degree of interest rate
pass-through. We have used the model of Ravenna and Walsh (2006) and Chowdhury
et. al. (2006) to analyze optimal policy both under discretion and commitment under
ZLB. However, for simplicity we have not introduced any uncertainty in our analysis. The
demand shock in our model follows an deterministic AR(1) as in Jung et. al. (2005) and
Chattopadhyay and Daniel (2016).
Our analysis shows while exit time (from ZLB) in the absence of cost channel is exoge-
nous under discretion, exit time both under discretion and commitment is endogenous due
to post-exit trade-o¤ between output gap and ination rate introduced by cost channel.
We also nd that, irrespective of the of cost channel to be present or absent, commit-
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ment outperforms discretion by promising future boom and ination and a T-only policy
closely replicates commitment. This is identical with results obtained by Chattopadhyay
and Daniel (2016) with no cost channel. Our paper further show that, exit date under
discretion, commitment and T-only policy rises with the magnitude of demand shock
given the degree of interest rate pass-through irrespective of the presence of cost channel.
However, given demand shock while exit date both under discretion and T-only policy are
shown to rise with the degree of interest rate pass-through/credit market imperfection, it
has been shown to fall under commitment. This happens since commitment stimulates
the system by promising future boom, ination. Commitment also promise a post-exit in-
ation and boom too. This gives an additional stimulus to the system which rises with the
degree of interest rate pass-through/credit market imperfection. The system compensates
the extra stimulus by preponing the exit from liquidity trap.
Rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3
and Section 4 analyzes the optimal policy under discretion and commitment respectively.
Section 5 describes the T-only policy and Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
Ravenna and Walsh (2006) has introduced cost channel in an otherwise canonical New
Keynesian DSGE model. The paper assumes that rms borrow money to pay the wage
bill of labor even before the production has taken place. The rm has to pay interest
payments to nancial intermediaries while paying it back. As a result, the marginal cost
of rm depends both on output gap and interest rate. The presence of interest rate in
marginal cost channel is the required cost channel. Araujo (2009) introduced nancial
market imperfection in the model of Ravenna and Wash (2006) and shows how the degree
of interest rate pass-through changes with the extent of nancial market imperfection.
We have used the model of Ravenna and Walsh (2006) and Chowdhury et. al. (2006)
for our analysis. The log-linearized model without uncertainty can be succinctly written
with help of an aggregate demand or IS equation given in equation (1).
yt+1 = yt +  [it   i  t+1]  ut
= yt +  [it   rnt   t+1] (1)
Equation (1) is derived by log-linearizing individuals Euler equation around zero ina-
tionary steady state.
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The supply side of the model is represented by a forward looking Phillips curve with
cost channel as given in equation (2).
t = t+1 + 
 
 1 + 

yt +  (it   i) (2)
In these equations yt denotes the output gap; ination (t) is the deviation about a long-
run value of zero; it denotes the nominal interest rate (deposit rate), with a long-run
equilibrium value of i = r = 1 

; with r dened as the long-run real interest rate; 
represents the intertemporal elasticity of substitution with   1,  = (1 s)(1 s)
s
, (where
(1  s) is the fraction of rms choosing their price optimally in each period) represents
the degree of price stickiness;  2 (0; 1) denotes the discount factor;  denotes the inverse
of elasticity of Frisch labor supply and ut represents the combination of shocks associated
with preferences, technology, scal policy, etc.
Araujo (2009) assumes, lt = (1 +  ) t = t, where, t = it   i is the deviation of
deposit rate from long-run real interest rate and lt = i
l
t i is deviation of lending rate from
long-run real interest rate.  2 (0; 1)measures the extent of nancial market imperfections
governing the degree of interest rate pass through. Note, we get our canonical model
without cost channel back when  = 0. Ravenna and Walsh (2006) assumes, even if rise
in interest rate increases ination rate in the presence of cost channel, the negative e¤ect
of output dominates so that, tighter monetary policy reduces ination rate. As a result
they set,  2 [1;  1+
 1 ) when cost channel is present.
1Note, there is no uncertainty in our
model for simplicity. As a result, we assume the demand shock follows a deterministic
AR (1) process as given in equation (3)
ut = 
t 1u1; 0 <  < 1 (3)
We dene natural rate of interest as,
rnt = i   1ut
Note, a large adverse demand shock puts the economy into liquidity trap with rnt < 0.
Ravenna and Walsh has also derived the loss function as the second order Taylor Series
expansion of the individuals utility function around zero ination steady state. The loss
1Note, unit rise in nominal interest rate reduces output gap by  unit through IS equation, which
in turn reduces ination by (
 1+)
 1 through by Phillips curve. However, unit rises in nominal interest
rate increase ination by  unit by Phillips curve. Therefore, negative output e¤ect dominates when,
 <
( 1+)
 1 . Also see, section 4.1.2 for restriction on .
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functions without uncertainty is,2
1
2
1X
t=1
t 1
 
2t + y
2
t

;  2 [0;1) (4)
where,  =
( 1+)

is weight given to output gap relative to ination.  > 1 is own price
elasticity of output.
3 Optimal Policy without Cost Channel
We use optimal policy without cost channel as a benchmark to compare the same
under cost channel. As a result, this section gives a brief description of the main results
of optimal policy without cost channel. Detail of the derivation and result can be found
in Jung, et al. (2005) and Chattopadhyay and Daniel (2016).3 Note, when there is no
cost channel,  = 0. We assume no uncertainty with deterministic demand shock as given
in equation (3). We further assume that, economy in in liquidity trap till T and exit
liquidity trap thereafter. This implies, once the economy exits it never falls into liquidity
trap. Given this monetary authority minimizes equation (4) by choosing output, ination
and nominal interest rate given equation (1), equation (2) and the feasibility constraint
it  0. Monetary authority minimizes loss given future expectations under discretion and
commitment endogenizes even future expectations into the process of minimization.
Some standard result of optimal policy without cost channel are, (i) exit time under
discretion is exogenous and depends entirely on the time path of natural rate of interest.
Economy is in liquidity trap as long as natural rate of interest rate is negative and exits
as soon as natural rate of interest becomes positive. Exit time under discretion rises
with magnitude and persistence of demand shock, (ii) commitment promises future boom
and ination and also postpones exit compared to discretion. These yield extra stimulus
and allows commitment to outperform discretion, (iii) Taylor rule with properly chosen
ination target and its persistence can replicate both discretion and commitment and (iv)
a T-only policy that only chooses exit time optimally but follows discretion after exit can
closely replicate commitment. Chattopadhyay and Daniel (2016) show that the above
2Ravenna and Walsh assimes a fraction, (1  t) of output is consumed by government. As a re-
sult the loss function takes the form, 12Et
1X
t=1
t 1

2t + 

yt   1 1+bt2. We have no government
expenditure. As a result, bt = 0 for all t.
3Also see, Eggertson and Woodford (2003), Adam and Billi (2006, 2007) and Nakov (2008).
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results remain unchanged even if we introduce uncertainty into the system. The optimal
time path of the system under discretion, commitment and T-only policy without cost
channel ( = 0) is given in Figure 2, Figure 3 and Figure 4 respectively.
4 Optimal Policy with Cost Channel
The next three subsection describes the optimal policy under ZLB when cost channel
is present. Subsection 4.1 describes the optimal policy under discretion, subsection 4.2
describes optimal policy under commitment and subsection 4.3 describes the optimal
policy under T-only policy. We keep on assuming no uncertainty for simplicity. As
a result, demand shock is assumed to follow the deterministic time path as given in
equation (3). Moreover, the economy is assumed to be in liquidity trap till period T and
exits thereafter.
4.1 Optimal Policy under Discretion
Monetary authority minimizes (2t + y
2
t ) by choosing output gap, ination rate and
nominal interest rate, subject to equation (1), (2) and the feasibility constraint, it  0
given future expectation of output gap and ination rate under discretion. This implies,
monetary authority optimizes each period under discretion. The Lagrangian of the prob-
lem under discretion is,
LD =
8><>:
 1
2
[2t + y
2
t ]  1;t [ (it   t+1   rnt )  yt+1 + yt]
 2;t [t    ( 1 + ) yt    (it   i)  t+1]
+3;tit
9>=>;
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The First Order Conditions are,
@L
@t
=  t   2;t = 0 (5)
@L
@yt
=  yt   1;t + 
 
 1 + 

2;t = 0 (6)
@L
@1;t
=  (it   t+1   rnt )  yt+1 + yt = 0 (7)
@L
@2;t
= t   
 
 1 + 

yt    (it   i)  t+1 = 0 (8)
@L
@it
=  1;t + 2;t + 3;t = 0 (9)
3;t
@L
@3;t
= 3;tit = 0; 3;t  0; it  0 with complementary slackness (10)
Equation (5) and (6) gives,
1;t =  
 
yt + 
 
 1 + 

t

(11)
and 3;t  0 implies,
1;t   2;t  0 (12)
from equation (9) and (10).4 To determine exit time under cost channel dene, Qdt =
 (    ( 1 + ))t   yt. Then, equation (6), (11) and (12) gives,
it = 0 till Qdt > 0
> 0; O.W. (13)
Note, higher  increases Qdt and delays exit. After exit, it is determined by equation
(7). We have checked numerically that, nominal interest rate becomes positive from zero
as soon as Qdt changes sign from positive to zero. This implies that the above exercise
captures the notion of discretion. Also note that higher  increases Qdt and delays exit.
This happens since higher  causes higher uctuations in output gap and ination rate
and causes higher welfare loss. Therefore, system needs higher stimulus to compensate
the welfare loss and achieves that by delaying exit.
To solve the model note, it = 0 for t = 1; 2; :::; T d. Equations (1) and (2) with it = 0
4Note, exit date depends only on 1;t when cost channel is absent ( = 0).
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gives,
Zt+1 = c+ AZt   arnt (14)
where,
c =
"
 i

i

#
; a =
"

0
#
; Zt =
"
yt
t
#
;
A =
241 + ( 1+)  
 (
 1+)

1

35
A forward solution of equation (14) yields
Zt =  
d
t + A
 (T d t+1)ZT d+1 (15)
where,
 dt =
T dX
k=t
A (k t+1)arnk  
T dX
k=t
A (k t+1)c
Note, since one eigenvalue of the matrix A is greater than one and other less than one,
higher T d and ZT d+1 gives more stimulus to the system. Now, solution of the system
entails we know ZT d+1 and T d. ZT d+1 is determined as follows. We know that, it > 0 and
3;t = 0 for t = T
d + 1; T d + 2; :::::. Equation (5), (6) and (9) with 3;t = 0 gives,
t =  yt (16)
where,
 =

 [ 1 (1  ) + ]
We have to solve equation (7), (8) and (16) simultaneously. Equation (7), (8) gives,
yt+1 + 

1 +



t+1 =

1  
 1 + 
 1

yt +


t + ut (17)
Note, for  2 (0;  1+
 1 ), equation (16) is negatively sloped and equation (17) is positively
sloped. Substituting equation (17) to (16) gives,
yt+1 = yt   ut

 
1 + 

  1 (18)
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where,
 =


(+  ( 1 + ))  1

 
1 + 

  1
We need  > 1 to solve equation (18) forward. We see that,  falls as  rises and there
exists a  2 [1; ] such that,  > 1 when  2 [1; ] and  <  1+
 1 . As a result, we
restrict our analysis to  2 [1; ] when cost channel is present.5 Note we have,  > 0 and
 > 1 for  2 [1; ]. Hence, we always get a post-exit trade-o¤ between output gap and
ination rate in the presence of cost channel (see, Ravenna and Walsh, 2006).
Forward solution of equation (18) gives,
yt =
ut

 
1 + 

  1 (  ) ; for t = T d + 1; T d + 2; :::: (19)
Substituting, equation (19) to equation (16) gives optimal post-exit ination rate.
Figure 1 describes the post-exit optimal response of output gap and ination rate to
adverse demand shock under discretion. Note, since  2 [1; ], equation (16) is negatively
sloped and equation (17) is positively sloped. Equation (16) is denoted by AA and
equation (17) is denoted by BB in Figure 1. An adverse demand shock shifts BB curve
down to BB1. This causes post-exit output gap to rise to y1and ination rate to fall to
1.
5Note, output gap is a jump variable under uncertainty. As a result, we need,  > 1 for a determinate
equilibrium. Ravenna and Walsh (2006), Chowdhury et. al. (2006) and Tillman (2007) have estimated
 2 [1; 1:4] . We have checked that we get  > 1 as long as  belongs to the range mentioned above.
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Figure 1: Post-exit Optimal Response to Adverse Demand Shock under
Discretion
However, impact of  on post-exit output gap is not monotonic. We see that,  has
threshold. When  is below the threshold,  falls at a faster rate and dominates the
rise in


 
1 + 

  1. As result, we see higher post-exit uctuation in output gap.
However,


 
1 + 

  1 rises rapidly when when  goes beyond the threshold, causing
lower uctuation in output gap. On the other hand, ination falls monotonically as 
rises because  rises monotonically with . In terms of Figure 1, higher  makes the AA
curve steeper and BB curve atter.
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Post-exit output gap and ination gives,
ZT+1 =
"
yT+1
T+1
#
(20)
Next, we calculate Zt for t = 1; 2; :::; T d given the terminal condition ZT d+1 numerically
from (15) . T d is determined as, Qd
T d
=  (    ( 1 + ))t yt > 0 last time. Then,
T d + 1 is the exit time with,
it = 0; t = 1; 2; :::; T
d
> 0; t = T d+1; T d + 2; :::
4.2 Optimal Policy under Commitment
This section analyzes the optimal policy under commitment or fully optimal policy.
Here, the objective of the monetary authority is to minimize equation (4) by choosing
output gap, ination rate and nominal interest rate, subject to equation (1), (2) and the
feasibility constraint, it  0. Unlike discretion, monetary authority endogenizes future
expectation of output gap and ination rate in the process of loss minimization under
commitment. There is no uncertainty for simplicity as before. The Lagrangian of the
problem under commitment is,
LC =
1X
t=1
t 1
8><>:
 1
2
[2t + y
2
t ]  1;t [ (it   t+1   rnt )  yt+1 + yt]
 2;t [t    ( 1 + ) yt    (it   i)  t+1]
+3;tit
9>=>;
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The First Order Conditions are,
@L
@t
=  t   2;t +  11;t 1 + 2;t 1 = 0 (21)
@L
@yt
=  yt   1;t + 
 
 1 + 

2;t + 
 11;t 1 = 0 (22)
@L
@1;t
=  (it   t+1   rnt )  yt+1 + yt = 0 (23)
@L
@2;t
= t   
 
 1 + 

yt    (it   i)  t+1 = 0 (24)
@L
@it
=  1;t + 2;t + 3;t = 0 (25)
3;t
@L
@3;t
= 3;tit = 0; 3;t  0; it  0 with complementary slackness (26)
From equation (25), 3;t  0 implies
Qct = 1;t   2;t  0 (27)
Equation (27) gives,
it = 0 till Qct > 0
= 0 O.W.
We assume economy is in liquidity trap for t = 1; 2; :::; T c and exit liquidity trap perma-
nently at t = T c+1. As a result, it = 0 till period T c and it > 0 from t = T c+1 onwards.
Equation (23) and (24) with it = 0 gives,
Zt+1 = c+ AZt   arnt (28)
Solving equation (29) forward gives,
Zt =  
c
t + A
 (T c t+1)ZT c+1 (29)
where,
 ct =
T cX
k=t
A (k t+1)arnk  
T cX
k=t
A (k t+1)c
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Note, since one eigenvalue of the matrix A is greater than one and other less than one,
higher T c and ZT c+1 gives more stimulus to the system. Now, solution of the system
entails we know ZT c+1 and T c. ZT c+1 is determined as follows. Equation (21) and (22)
gives,
t = Ct 1  DZt (30)
where,
t =
"
1;t
2;t
#
; Zt =
"
yt
t
#
; D =
"
  ( 1 + )
0 1
#
C =
"
 1 +
( 1+)

 ( 1 + )


1
#
A forward solution of equation (30) with 1 = 0 and using equation (29) yields,
T c =  
T cX
t=1
C(T
c t)DZt
=  
T cX
t=1
C(T
c t)D
 
 ct + A
 (T c t+1)ZT c+1

(31)
Equation (31) solves T c such that, Qct > 0 for the last time. It also solves T c . However,
to do that we need to know ZT c+1. ZT c+1 is solved as follows.
Note we have it > 0 for t = T c + 1; T c + 2; ::::. We also have,
2;t =


1;t; t = T
c + 1; T c + 2; :::: (32)
Equation (21) and (22) with equation (32) gives,
t =   

1;t + 

 1 +
1


1;t 1 (33)
and,
yt =   1

1    1 +  


1;t + 
 1 11;t 1 (34)
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Again, by eliminating it from equation (23) and (24) we have,
yt+1 + 

1 +



t+1 =

1  
 1 + 
 1

yt +


t + ut (35)
Now, equation (33), (34) and (35) yields, following di¤erence equation,
1;t+1 = b11;t + b21;t 1 + b3ut (36)
where
b1 =
 1 2# 1 +  1 1 + #+ 2
 + 
; b2 =   1; b3 =  ( + ) 1
and
 =
2

[1 +


];  = [1    1 +  

] 1; # =
2
22
Equation (36) has two eigenvalues, !1 > 1 and !2 2 (0; 1). Solving equation (36) we have,
1;t = !21;t 1 +
ut
(!1   )( + )
2;t =


1;t; t = T
c + 1; T c + 2; :::: (37)
Note, equation (33), (34) along with equation (37) gives,
ZT+1 = T + JuT+1 (38)
where,
 =
"
 1[ 1   !2f1  ( 1 + )  g] 0
 1 + 1 !2

0
#
J =
24  1[1 ( 1+) ](!1 )(+)

(!1 )(+)
35
Substituting equation (38) to equation (31) gives,
T c =  W 1W2 (39)
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where,
W1 = I +
T cX
t=1
C(T
c t)DA (T
c t+1)
W2 =
T cX
t=1
C(T
c t)D[ ct + A
 (T c t+1)JuT+1]
Equation (39) solves T c such that QcT c > 0 for the last time. It also solves, T c. Then,
equation (37) solves 1;t and 1;t for t = T
c + 1; T c + 2; ::::. This allows equation (33),
(34) to solve yt and t for t = T c + 1; T c + 2; ::::. Nominal interest rate, it = 0 till period
T c and it > 0 for t = T c+1; T c+2; ::::.. Equation (23) solves it for t = T c+1; T c+2; ::::.
Figure 3 shows the impulse response under commitment for di¤erent .
4.3 The T-only Policy
Chattopadhyay and Daniel (2016) introduces a new policy known as T-only policy.
Monetary authority chooses the exit time optimally under T-only policy and follows the
discretionary policy post exit. This implies, pre-exit solution of output gap and ination
rate is obtained from,
Zt =  
o
t + A
 (T o t+1)ZT o+1
and,
yt =
ut

 
1 + 

  1 (  )
t =  yt; t = T o + 1; T o + 2; ::::
where,
 ot =
T oX
k=t
A (k t+1)arnk  
T oX
k=t
A (k t+1)c
and T o is chosen optimally such that equation (4) is minimized. Figure 4 shows the
impulse response under T-only policy for di¤erent . Note, irrespective of the presence
and absence of cost channel, T-only policy replicates fully optimal policy (commitment)
very closely.
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5 Calibration and Impulse Response
We illustrate the base line impulse response of output gap, ination rate, nominal
interest rate and real interest rate using following parameterization.
Parameter Description Value Source6
 logarithmic preference 1 AB (2006)
 discount factor 0.99 standard
 measure of price stickiness 0.028 AB (2006)
 inverse of slope of Frisch labor supply 1 RW (2006)
 relative weight on output gap in loss function 0.0074 AB (2006)
Table 1: Calibrated Parameters
Discount factor,  = 0:99 implies long run real interest rate, i =  1   1 = 0:0101.
 = 0:028 implies price is highly sticky with only 16% of rm can choose their price
optimally each period.7 Moreover, above parameterization gives  = 1:8: Ravenna and
Walsh (2006), Chowdhury et. al. (2006) and Tillman (2007) has estimated  2 [1; 1:4].
Therefore, we restrict our analysis to two extreme cases;  = 1 and 1:4. We have used
no cost channel,  = 0 as our benchmark to check examine the impact of cost channel
on optimal policy. Beside these, we need demand shock to be large enough to send the
economy into liquidity trap and persists for a considerable period of time. Hence we set,
u1 = 0:024;  = 0:9
Before, going to present the full blown analysis of impulse response let us present some
important results in Table 1. These results supplements the results hidden in impulse
response analysis. However, exit time as shown in Table 2 under discretion, commitment
and T-only policy falls as magnitude of demand shock falls for given . Table also 2 shows
that, while exit time under discretion and T-only policy rises but falls under commitment
as  rises. Table 2 also shows that, T-only policy closely replicates commitment for varying
6AB: Adam and Billi and RW: Ravenna and Walsh
7The slope of the Phillips curve without cost channel in Adam and Billi (2006) is  = 0:056. Same in
Ravenna and Walsh (2006) with cost channel is 
 
 1 + 

. I set,  = 0:028 such that, 
 
 1 + 

=
0:056. It allows us to identify only the impact credit market imperfection or interest rate pass-through
on the optimal policy.
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.
u = 0:021;  = 0:9
 T d T c T o L
D
Lc
Lc
LTO
0 9 13 12 1:15 0:0087
1 10 13 14 17:42 0:78
1:4 11 12 15 3:30 0:99
u = 0:018;  = 0:9
 T d T c T o L
D
Lc
Lc
LTO
1 7 8 10 10:9 0:047
Table 2: Comparative Analysis
Figure 2 shows the impulse response under discretion for di¤erent degree of credit
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market imperfection or interest rate pass-through ().
Figure 2: Impulse Response under Discretion
Figure 2 shows that large adverse demand shock puts economy into liquidity trap and
causes recession and deation. However, while post-exit output gap becomes positive
and gradually converges to zero economy su¤ers from deation for the entire time period.
Figure 2 also shows that, uctuations both in output gap and ination rate rises with . It
happens since given zero nominal interest rate during liquidity trap, higher  causes more
uctuations in current and future ination. This causes higher uctuations in real interest
rate and thereby output gap. As a result, exit time also rises with  under discretion which
provides extra stimulus to the system to minimize welfare loss. Figure 2 also shows that,
given  output uctuates more than ination rate since we have assumed that negative
impact of output gap on ination rate of a tighter monetary policy dominates the impact
of interest rate on ination. We have also checked that, while natural rate of interest
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(rnt ) becomes positive at t = 9, nominal interest rate becomes positive at t = 10. Hence,
unlike without cost channel the time path of nominal interest rate under cost channel is
endogenous and does not get determined by the time path of nominal interest rate only.
This happens as cost channel introduces trade-o¤ between output gap and ination rate
after exit.
Figure 3 gives the impulse response under commitment for di¤erent values of . Figure
3 shows that, contrary to discretion we have lower uctuations in output gap and ination
rate and real interest rate under commitment as interest rate pass-through rises due to
(i) promise of future ination and boom and (ii) higher expected value of both ination
and output gap post-exit (ZT c+1).
Figure 3: Impulse Response under Commitment
Promise of future boom and ination along with higher post-exit expectation of output
gap and ination gives added stimulus to the system, causing exit date under commitment
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to fall as  rises to compensate the added stimulus and minimize the welfare loss. As a
result, contrary to no cost channel, exit time under commitment comes soonest in the
presence of cost channel as shown in Figure 3 and furnished in Table 2.
Figure 4 portrays the impulse response under T-only policy. We know that monetary
authority in a T-only policy chooses the exit date optimally and follows discretion post-
exit. Chattopadhyay and Daniel (2016) show that, a T-only policy closely replicates
commitment without cost channel. We see that, impulse response given in Figure 4 is
very similar to Figure 3. It shows that, T-only policy closely replicate commitment even
when the cost channel is present. As a result, loss under commitment is almost identical
to loss under T-only policy as given in Table 2.
Figure 4: Impulse Response under T-only Policy
However, though impulse response under commitment and T-only policy are similar, exit
date under T-only policy rises with  but falls under commitment. To explain note, future
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expected output gap and ination under T-only is lower than the same under commitment,
ZT o+1 < ZT c+1. Hence, T-only can only produce results closer to commitment if it gets a
higher stimulus by postponing exit date than commitment.
6 Conclusions
The exit out of ZLB varies from one economy to other depending on its characteris-
tics. Di¤erent degrees of interest rate pass-through (or varying strength of cost channel)
originating from di¤erent extent of credit market imperfection is possibly one such char-
acteristic leading to disparate exit dates. In absence of cost channel, exit under discretion
is exogenous and the exit under commitment is endogenous. Along with this, commit-
ment outperforms discretion by promising future boom and ination and by delaying exit.
Introduction of cost channel makes exit date endogenous under both commitment and dis-
cretion. This is due to the trade-o¤ between ination and output gap induced by the cost
channel. Exit date rises monotonically under discretion with magnitude of demand shock
and degree of interest rate pass-through. Commitment still outperforms discretion with
a promise of future boom and ination and post exit expected boom and ination. This
gives an extra stimulus to the system under commitment. System compensates the stim-
ulus by preponing its exit compared to discretion. On the other hand, though a T-only
policy promises future boom and ination, it does not promise post exit ination. As a
result, T-only policy needs to postpone its exit to gain stimulus and producing results
closer to commitment.
7 Appendix
7.1 Commitment with Cost Channel
We solve the second order di¤erence equation (36) as follows,
1;t+1 = b11;t + b21;t 1 + b3ut
We assume, t+1 = 1;t and rewritten the second order di¤erence equation given above
as,
 t+2 = B t+1 + but+1
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where,
 t+2 =
"
1;t+2
t+2
#
; B =
"
b1 b2
1 0
#
; b =
"
b3
1
#
Let !1 and !2 be the two eigenvalues of B such that !1 > 1 and 0 < !2 < 1. Now,
dene

 =
"
!1 0
0 !2
#
and the matrix of eigenvector of B,
E =
"
e1 e2
1 1
#
; ei = !i
Diagonalization gives,
 
0
t+2 = 
 
0
t+1 + E
 1but+1
where  
0
t+2 = H
 1 t+2. Now, we solve the rst equation forward and second equation
backward and do standard algebraic manipulation to get, equation (37) given in the text.
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